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Abstract
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problems with concave revenue functions and common support, a uniform price is guaranteed
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and Results
An important use of information about demand is to engage in price discrimination. A large body
of literature, starting with the classic work of Pigou (1920), examines what happens to prices,
quantities and various measures of welfare as the market is segmented. A seller is engaging in
third-degree price discrimination if he uses information about consumer characteristics to offer
different prices to different segments of the market. As every segment is offered a different price,
there is scope for the producer to extract more surplus from the consumer. With the increase in
available information about consumer demand comes increasing flexibility in the ensuing market
segmentation.1
Our main contribution is to compare the revenue performance of third-degree price discrim-
ination against a uniform pricing policy. A uniform pricing policy offers the same price to all
segments of the market. Theorem 1 establishes that for a broad class of third-degree price
discrimination problems with concave revenue functions and common support, a uniform price
is guaranteed to achieve one half of the optimal monopoly profits. Theorem 1 establishes the
revenue bound for any arbitrary number of segments and prices that the seller would use with
third-degree price discrimination.
We investigate the limits of this result by weakening the assumptions of concavity and
common support. First, Proposition 4 shows the necessity of the common support assumption
by studying a setting with concave profit functions that have finite but different supports. We
display a sequence of segments under which the revenue ratio of uniform price to third-degree
price discrimination goes to zero.2 Second, Proposition 5 notes that the approximation result
does not hold for the commonly studied class of regular distributions. More specifically, we
can weaken the concavity of the revenue function to merely assume regular environments but
maintaining common supports). In other words, we assume that the revenue function is only
concave in the space of quantities rather than of prices. Proposition 5 establishes that for
some regular distributions uniform pricing can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to optimal
third-degree price discrimination. The importance of the aforementioned results is that they
establish that both concavity and common support are necessary assumptions for a good revenue
performance. By contrast, if any of these assumptions is dropped (not necessarily at the same
time) then the revenue ratio of uniform price to third-degree price discrimination can be small.
1Pigou (1920) suggested a classification of different forms of price discrimination. First degree (or perfect) dis-
crimination is given when the monopolist charges each unit with a price that is equal to the consumer’s maximum
willingness to pay for that unit. Second degree price discrimination arises when the price depends on the quantity
(or quality) purchased. Third degree price discrimination occurs when different market segments are offered different
prices, e.g. due to temporal or geographical differentiation.
2In the related literature section we discuss the relation between this result and Malueg and Snyder (2006).
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1.2. Related Literature
Our work builds on the classic literature on third-degree price discrimination, see e.g., Pigou
(1920), Robinson (1933) and Schmalensee (1981). In more recent work, Aguirre et al. (2010)
identify conditions on the shape of demand function for price discrimination to increase welfare
and output compared to the non-discriminating price case.
Bergemann et al. (2015) analyze the limits of price discrimination. They show that the
segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combination
of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer surplus is nonnegative, (ii) producer
surplus is at least as high as profits under the uniform monopoly price, and (iii) total surplus does
not exceed the surplus generated by the efficient trade. Building on this work, Cummings et al.
(2020) provide approximate guarantees to segment the market when an intermediary has only
partial information of the buyer’s values.
In contrast, in this paper we analyze the profit implications of uniform pricing versus third-
degree price discrimination. We are particularly interested in understanding what are the ap-
proximation guarantees that a uniform price can deliver. Closest to our work is a paper by
Malueg and Snyder (2006) which examines the profit effects of third-price discrimination com-
pared to uniform pricing. They consider a setting similar to ours in which the monopolist expe-
riences a total cost function for serving different segments. They show that when the demand
is continuous and the total cost is superadditive, the ratio of third-degree price discrimination
profit to uniform price profit is bounded above by the number of segments with distinct prices
that are served under price discrimination. They provide an example under which this bound
is tight. In the worst case, the bound for the ratio equals the total number of segments. In
contrast, in the present paper we identify a key and general condition which leads to a bound
that is not contingent on the number of segments in the market. Their Proposition 2 is similar
to our Proposition 4 in that their result also provides an example that attains the worst case
performance for distributions with different support (and linear demand).
Since the seminal work of Myerson (1981), there has been a great deal of interest in the re-
search community on simple or approximate mechanisms design. In general, characterizing opti-
mal selling mechanisms is a difficult task, see e.g., Daskalakis et al. (2014) and Papadimitriou et al.
(2016). Hence, deriving simple-practical mechanisms is of utmost importance. As we discuss
below, there are interesting connections between the analysis of simple mechanisms and our
price discrimination setup that to the best of our knowledge had not been uncovered before.
Along these lines, Chawla et al. (2007) study the unit-demand pricing problem in which a
seller with n units sells to a consumer who has a unit demand. In their main result, they
find a pricing policy that delivers a 3-approximation with respect to the optimal Myersonian
revenue (this is true for non-regular distributions). In the regular i.i.d. case they obtain a
2.17-approximation that prices every item the same. They also show that the Vickrey auction
with optimal reservation values is a 2-approximation to the optimal single-item auction.
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Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) consider general single-parameter environments with n
bidders in which each agent has a valuation for receiving service, and there is a system of spec-
ifying feasible sets (e.g., in k-unit auctions the sets are those of size k). In these settings, they
investigate how VCG with specific reserve prices approximates the seller’s optimal expected
revenue. They show that for independent valuations, downward-closed(matroid) environments
and under MHR (regularity), VCG with monopoly reserves yields a 2-approximation to optimal
mechanism (this is tight). For single-item with valuations drawn independently from regular dis-
tributions, they establish that V CG with an anonymous reserve price yields a 4-approximation
to the expected revenue of the optimal auction.
In the single item setting with n buyers, Alaei et al. (2018) provide several approximation
guarantees by analyzing the performance of anonymous pricing (posted price) against an ex-ante
relaxation. They show that the ratio of ex-ante and posted price is upper bounded by e (and
this is tight) for independent (non-identically) distributed values from regular distributions.
As a corollary they improve the 4-approximation in Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) to an
e-approximation. Their key insight is to show that triangular instances—instances for which
the revenue functions in the quantile space are triangle-shaped—are the worst case in terms of
guarantee performance. In the single item setting with independent and regular distributions,
Jin et al. (2018) establishes a tight 2.62-approximation of anonymous pricing compared to the
optimal Myerson auction. In the n heterogeneous items, unit-demand buyer setting they provide
the same approximation guarantee for the ratio of optimal item pricing to uniform pricing. The
main technique is to find a worst-case scenario instance. Because the ratio is more complex than
in Alaei et al. (2018), the worst-case scenario instance is no longer triangular. The present paper
differs from the aforementioned works in that we consider the problem faced by a monopolist
selling to a single buyer whose valuation can come from one of many segments. Nevertheless,
in line with these works, we aim to obtain performance guarantees when comparing the best
possible pricing for the monopolist—third-degree price discrimination—to the simple pricing
scheme—uniform pricing. In terms of techniques we resort to related triangular instances as
worst case performance settings as we discuss in the next paragraph.
Our work also shares some similarities with the approach taken by Dhangwatnotai et al.
(2015), see also Hartline (2013), to study the prior-independent single sample mechanism. In
this mechanism, bidders are allocated according to VCG mechanism with reserves randomly
computed from other bidders’ bids. A key insight of Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) is a novel
interpretation of the classic work by Bulow and Klemperer (1996), which establishes that the
optimal reserve auction for n bidders is revenue dominated by a second price auction without
reserve with n+ 1 bidders. Suppose that bidders draw i.i.d. values from the same distribution.
Then, if n = 1, the optimal auction with reserve is a simple posted price mechanism. When
n = 2, each bidder’s contribution to the profit is the same and the winner pays a random
price. In turn, two times the profit from a random price is larger than the profit from the
optimal posted price. That is, in this case, random pricing achieves half of the optimal profit.
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Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) expand this idea to more complex settings and they formalize it by
using an intuitive geometric approach similar to the one we present in Section 3. In particular,
under the assumption of regular distributions, the profit function in the quantile space turns out
to be concave. Consequentially, the profit function is bounded below by a triangle with height
equal to the maximum profit. This implies that the expected profit from uniformly selecting
a quantile is bounded below by the area of the triangle or, equivalently, by half the maximum
profit. The proof of our result in Theorem 1 relies on a similar insight. However, we must assume
that the profit functions are concave in the price space, otherwise our half approximation result
might not hold. Indeed, in Proposition 5 we show that for regular distributions, simple pricing
leads to arbitrarily poor guarantees.
2. Model
We consider a monopolist selling to K different customer segments. Each segment k is in
proportion αk in the market where αk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. If the
monopolist offers price pk to segment k, then the monopolist receives an associated profit of
Rk(pk) , pk · (1 − Fk(pk)) ,
where Fk(·) is the cumulative density function of a distribution with support in Θk ⊂ R+. The
total profit the monopolist receives by pricing according to p = (p1, . . . , pK) the different types
is
Π(p) =
K∑
k=1
αkRk(pk).
The monopolist wishes to choose p to maximize Π(p).
The monopolist can choose prices in different manners. First, for each type k, the monopolist
can set the price p⋆k where
p⋆k ∈ argmax
p∈Θk
Rk(p).
Let p⋆ be the vector of prices {p⋆k}
K
k=1, we refer to these prices as the per-segment optimal prices.
Note that p⋆ correspond to the case of third-degree price discrimination. We use ΠM to denote
Π(p⋆). We sometimes denote ΠM (α,R) to make explicit the dependence of the monopolist
profit on the model parameters.
Another way of setting prices that is relevant to practice is to simply set the uniform price
for all segments. In this case, the monopolist must solve the problem
ΠU , max
p∈∪K
k=1
Θk
K∑
k=1
αkRk(p).
We use pU to denote the optimal price in the above problem, which we refer to as the optimal
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uniform price. With some abuse of notation we sometimes use ΠU (p) to denote Π(p) when all
the components of p are equal to p. Our main objective in this paper is to study how the best
third-degree price discrimination scheme compares to the best uniform price scheme. That is,
we are interested in analyzing the ratio
min
α,R
ΠU (α,R)
ΠM (α,R)
, (P)
under different parameters environments.
3. Concave Profit Functions
In this section, we assume that the profit functions, Rk(·), are concave. We will further assume
that the supports, Θk, are well behaved in the sense that Θk = Θ for all k where Θ is a closed and
bounded interval,[0, p], of R+. In later sections, we analyze (P) under relaxed assumptions. In
what follows, we provide a simple geometric argument to show that in the current environment
the optimal value of problem (P) is bounded below by 1/2. The argument is similar to the
one presented in Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) and Hartline (2013), but they assume regular
distributions, and therefore concavity of the profit function, in quantile space. Later we show
that our 1/2 approximation result does not hold under regularity.
Let
rk , αkRk(p
⋆
k),
that is, rk corresponds to the maximum profit the seller can obtain from the fraction αk of
segment k customer. Note that ΠM equals
∑K
k=1 rk. Since for each segment k the profit
function is concave in Θ we can lower bound it by a triangular-shaped function that we denote
RLk (p) as depicted in Figure 1 (a).
p0
∑
K
k=1R
L
k
(p)
pp⋆1 p
⋆
2 p
⋆
3
ΠU
pS
ΠL
p⋆1 p
⋆
2 p
⋆
3
p0
Rk(p)
p
(b)(a)
Figure 1: (a) The solid lines depict the concave profit function of each type, αkRk(p). The dashed
lines depict the lower bounds RLk (p) for each type. (b) The solid line shows the sum of the profit
functions over types,
∑K
k=1 αkRk(p). The dashed (thick) line shows the sum of the lower bound over
types,
∑K
k=1 R
L
k (p).
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More precisely, we define the lower bound functions
RLk (p) ,


rk
p⋆
k
· p if p ∈ [0, p⋆k]
rk
p−p⋆
k
· (p− p) if p ∈ [p⋆k, p].
Observe that
∑K
k=1 R
L
k (p) is a concave-piecewise linear function that achieves its maximum at
some {p⋆k}
K
k=1. We use Π
L to denote its maximum value. Then, it is easy to see that ΠU ≥ ΠL
because
∑K
k=1 R
L
k (p) lower bounds
∑K
k=1 αkRk(p), see Figure 1 (b). Next, we argue that
ΠL = max
p∈{p⋆
1
,...,p⋆
K
}
{
K∑
k=1
RLk (p)
}
≥
1
2
K∑
k=1
rk =
1
2
ΠM . (1)
See Theorem 1 below for a formal statement. Consider Figure 2 and note that ΠL · p is equal
to the area of the smallest rectangle that contains the graph of
∑K
k=1R
L
k (p). As a consequence,
ΠL · p is an upper bound for the area below the curve
∑K
k=1 R
L
k (p), that is,
ΠL · p ≥
∫ p
0
K∑
k=1
RLk (p)dp =
K∑
k=1
∫ p
0
RLk (p)dp =
K∑
k=1
rk · p
2
,
where in the last equality we have used that RLk (p) is triangle-shaped and, therefore, the area
below its curve equals rk · p/2. Dividing both sides in the expression above by p yields Eq. (1),
completing the proof.
p0 pp⋆1 p
⋆
2 p
⋆
3
ΠL
∑
K
k=1 R
L
k
(p)
r1
r2
r3
Figure 2: Proof of Theorem 1: the area below
∑K
k=1 Rk,L(p) equals the sum of the areas below Rk,L(p)
for all k.
Theorem 1 (Uniform price is a half approximation).
Suppose that the profit functions Rk(p) are concave and defined in the same bounded interval
Θ ⊂ R+ for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Then Π
U is at least half as large as ΠM . In particular,
ΠU = max
p∈Θ
{
K∑
k=1
αkRk(p)
}
≥ max
p∈{p⋆
1
,...,p⋆
K
}
{
K∑
k=1
αkRk(p)
}
≥
1
2
ΠM .
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Theorem 1 provides a fundamental guarantee of uniform pricing compared to optimal third-
degree price discrimination. In particular, the monopolist can simple use a judiciously chosen
price across all customer segments to ensure half of the best possible profit from perfectly
discriminating across the different segments in the market. The theorem also suggests two simple
and appealing ways of selecting the price. First, the monopolist can optimize against the mixture
of customer segments to derive the optimal uniform price. This is advantageous for situations
in which the monopolist possesses aggregate market information and perfectly discriminating
segments is not an available option. When the monopolist has more granular market information,
for example the monopolist knows the prices {p⋆k}
K
k=1, then it is not necessary for the monopolist
to optimize over the full range of prices but he can simply choose one of the K prices at
hand. Interestingly, it is possible to achieve the same revenue guarantee by setting a price
pU = p¯/2 that only uses the upper bound of the support.3 Indeed, for any k, we have that
αkRk(p
U ) ≥ RLk (p
U ) ≥ rk/2, where the last inequality follows from R
L
k (p
U )/pU = rk/p
⋆
k and
p > p⋆k. Adding the previous inequality over k obtains the desired inequality. In turn, half of
the best possible profit can also be secured by using minimal information about the segments
distributions.
As shown by the next example, the profit guarantee in Theorem 1 is tight.
Example 1.
Consider for example a case with two segments in the same proportion and triangle-shaped profit
functions. Furthermore, assume that that p⋆1 is close to zero, say ε > 0, and p
⋆
2 is close to p;
and that for both profit functions, the maximum profit is the same and equal to one. Then ΠM
equals to 12 · 1 +
1
2 · 1 = 1 whereas the optimal uniform price is any price between p
⋆
1 and p
⋆
2,
therefore, ΠU equals 12R1(ε) +
1
2R2(ε) ≈
1
2 + 0.
The result in Theorem 1 is intimately related to the problem of ex-post individually rational
screening in which the seller must optimally design a menu of contracts that incentivize buyers of
different type to self select, see e.g. Krähmer and Strausz (2015) and Bergemann et al. (2018).
The optimal static pricing in the screening setting is the same as our optimal uniform pricing.
However, the optimal screening pricing is different from the third-degree pricing as sequential
screening imposes incentive constraints that translate into information rents the monopolist
must give up; in the screening problem, buyers have private information about their types. In
turn the optimal screening profit is upper bounded by ΠM but is an upper bound to ΠU . This
leads us to the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 (Half approximation in sequential screening).
Suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 1 hold. Then in the ex-post individually rational
screening setting of Krähmer and Strausz (2015) and Bergemann et al. (2018), the optimal
static contract delivers a 1/2-approximation for seller’s profits.
3We thank John Vickers for suggesting this.
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As discussed in Section 1.2, our result and approach shares some similarities to that in
Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015). For the case of one buyer—and regular distributions—they show
that the expected profit of randomly selecting a price achieves half of the optimal profit. Their
approach uses the fact that the profit function in the quantile space for regular distributions is
concave and then a uniform randomization over quantities. We can proceed in a similar fashion
to show that the expected profit of uniformly choosing prices achieves half the profit of third-
degree price discrimination. Indeed, suppose we set a price p at random such that p ∼ U [0, p].
Then for the expected profit we have,
E[ΠU (p)] =
∫ p
0
K∑
k=1
αkRk(p) ·
1
p
dp ≥
1
p
·
∫ p
0
K∑
k=1
RLk (p) dp =
1
p
·
K∑
k=1
rk · p
2
=
1
2
ΠM . (2)
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Uniformly at random pricing).
Suppose that the profit functions Rk(p) are concave and defined in the same bounded interval
Θ ⊂ R+ for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Then for p ∼ U [0, p] we have that Ep[Π
U (p)] is at least half as
large as ΠM .
The difference of Theorem 1 with Eq. (2) stems from the fact that in the former, we choose a
unique price, pU , whereas in the latter, we randomize over Θ. In Section 4, we further elaborate
on the differences with Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015).
A natural question that emerges from Theorem 1 is about what uniform price to use.
According to the theorem, in order to achieve the approximation guarantee, it is enough to
choose the price p⋆k⋆ that solves max
k
ΠU (p⋆k). However, if we consider the next best price,
p2nd ∈ argmaxk 6=k⋆ Π
U (p⋆k), is it possible to achieve a good approximation guarantee? The next
proposition answers this question.
Proposition 2 (Second best price).
The second best price among the per-segment-optimal prices, p2nd, can deliver an arbitrarily low
profit guarantee. More precisely, for any ε > 0 there exists (α,R) such that ΠU (p2nd)/ΠM =
O(ε).
Proof. Consider K ≥ 2, p = 1, α1 = · · · = αK = 1/K and let n ≥ 1. Define the profit functions
by
R1(p) ,


n
1/n · p if p ∈ [0, 1/n]
n
1−1/n · (1− p) if p ∈ [1/n, 1],
and Rk(p) ,


εk
(1−εk)
· p if p ∈ [0, 1− εk]
1− p if p ∈ [1− εk, 1],
where εk ∈ (0, ε) for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} are fixed. Note that the price of type 1 is the optimal
uniform price when n is large, that is, pU = 1/n. Therefore, the second best price, p2nd, must
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equal 1− εkˆ for some kˆ ≥ 2. Then,
ΠU (p2nd) =
1
K

R1(1− εkˆ) +∑
k≥2
Rk(1− εkˆ)

 ≤ 1
K

 n
1− 1/n
εkˆ +
∑
k≥2
max{εkˆ,
εk
1− εk
· (1− εkˆ)}


Whereas the profit of the perfect discrimination is
ΠM =
1
K
R1(1/n) +
1
K
∑
k≥2
R2(1 − εk) =
1
K
n+
1
K
ε =
1
K

n+∑
k≥2
εk

 ≥ n
K
.
Then,
ΠU (p2nd)
ΠM
≤
n
1−1/nε+
∑
k≥2max{εkˆ,
εk
1−εk
· (1 − εkˆ)}
n
→ ε as n→∞.
Proposition 2 establishes that by using the second best price among the per-segment-optimal
prices, the monopolist profit can be arbitrarily small. In the proof, we construct concave profit
functions such that the profit from the first type is arbitrarily large at p⋆1 but the profit from
any other type k ≥ 2 at p⋆k is arbitrarily low. In turn, p
U coincides with p⋆1 and p
2nd is among
segments k ≥ 2. As a consequence, the monopolist profit from using p2nd across segments is
arbitrarily small compared to the profit from perfect price discrimination.
4. Profit Performance in General Environments
In this section we examine deviations from the environment studied is Section 3. In particular,
we aim to understand how (P) behaves when we relax the assumptions in Theorem 1. We
first look into the assumption of finite support and consider profit functions with different
supports. Then, we study non-concave environments. In the latter, we are specially interested
in common well-behaved environments such as regular and MHR (monotone hazard rate) value
distributions.
4.1. All Concave with Unbounded Support
In Theorem 1, we considered concave profit functions supported on some common finite interval
Θ. In the next proposition, we relax the finite support assumption while keeping a common
support and concave profit functions across customer segments.
Proposition 3 (No gap with unbounded support).
Suppose that the profit functions for all segments are concave with common and unbounded
support Θ = [0,∞] then ΠU = ΠM .
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that p⋆1 ≤ · · · ≤ p
⋆
K . Note that the concavity of
the profit functions together with the unbounded support assumption obliges each Rk(p) to be
10
increasing up to p⋆k and then constant and equal to Rk(p
⋆
k) for any price p larger than p
⋆
k for all
k ≥ 1. In turn, by setting pU equal to p⋆K the profit Π
U becomes
∑K
k=1 αkRk(p
⋆
k) = Π
M .
The proposition establishes that in the concave case with unbounded and common support
there is no gap between no price discrimination and full price discrimination. The intuition
behind Proposition 3 is simple. Concavity, together with the unbounded support assumption,
implies that the marginal profit for each segment must equal zero for sufficiently large prices.
As a consequence, setting an equal and sufficiently large price for every segment achieves the
optimal third-degree price discrimination outcomes.
4.2. Necessity of Common Support
Here we consider concave profit functions supported on some finite interval Θk for each segment
k ≥ 1. In contrast to the previous sections, we will not assume that Θk = Θ for all segments.
Proposition 4 (Necessity of common support).
If we allow for different supports across segments, then the optimal uniform price can deliver
an arbitrarily small profit guarantee as the number of segments increases.
Proof. We construct concave profit functions with finite support but such that Θk 6= Θj for all
k 6= j. Let the profit functions be defined by
Rk(p) =


p if p ∈ [0, vk]
vk
εk
(vk + εk − p) if p ∈ [vk, vk + εk]
with
vk =
1
(K − k + 1)
, αk =
1
K
, εk ∈ (0, vk+1 − vk), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
The perfect price discrimination profit is
ΠM =
K∑
k=1
αkvk =
1
K
K∑
k=1
1
K − k + 1
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
1
k
.
The optimal uniform price must be achieved at one of the vk, hence
ΠU =
1
K
max
k=1,...,K
{ K∑
j=k
vk
}
=
1
K
max
k=1,...,K
{ 1
K − k + 1
· (K − k + 1)
}
=
1
K
.
Hence,
ΠU
ΠM
=
1
K
1
K
∑K
k=1
1
k
=
1∑K
k=1
1
k
≈
1
log(K)
→ 0 as K ↑ ∞.
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p0
Rk(p)
1
1
5
1/5
1
4
1/4
1
3
1/3
1
2
1/2
1
p0
∑
K
k=1 αkRk(p)
1
1/5
1
5
1
4
1
3
1
2
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Example for construction of concave profit functions with different support as in the proof
of Proposition 4 for K = 5. In (a) we illustrate the profit functions for each segment where the value
and optimal per-segment price decay as 1/k. In (b) we show
∑K
k=1 αkRk(p), it is maximized at any of
the per-segment optimal prices and is bounded above by 1/K.
Proposition 4 shows the necessity of the common support assumption. In the proof, we
construct concave profit functions that have finite support, but the end points of the supports
are increasing, see Figure 4 (a). In the construction, all segments are given the same weight
and the profit functions are triangle shaped. All of them start at zero, go up along the 45
degree line, peak at 1/k and then go down sharply such that the upper end of the support of
type k is strictly between 1k and
1
k−1 (solid lines in Figure 4 (a)). In turn, Π
M (normalized
by the per-segment proportions) grows logarithmically with K. Since the end of the supports
are strictly increasing and non-overlapping, the uniform price profit at the per-segment optimal
prices, ΠU (1/k), is constant and equal to 1 (normalized by the per-segment proportions), see
Figure 4 (b). For example consider p⋆3 = 1/3, at this price R1(1/3) = R2(1/3) = 0 and
R3(1/3) = R4(1/3) = R5(1/3) = 1/3 hence 5 · Π
U = 0 + 0 + 3 · 13 . As a result, the ratio in (P)
goes to zero as the number of segments increases. Note that this only works because the profit
functions do not have common support. The non-common support allows for the possibility of
having profit functions such that at the per-segment optimal prices some of them equal zero. In
turn, in terms of ΠU , at each p⋆k there is some profit loss compared to the same-support case and
that profit loss is large enough to be outperformed by ΠM . We note that a similar version of
this result was stated in Malueg and Snyder (2006). Their proof is inductive whereas our proof
in constructive and provides an intuitive characterization of the necessity of common support.
Finally, we note that in the context of simple optimal auctions, Hartline and Roughgarden
(2009) developed a related construction to argue that an anonymous reserve price can obtain a
revenue guarantee that does not scale with the number of bidders in a single-item setting. We
think it is interesting that a similar construction applies to our price discrimination setting.
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4.3. Non-Concave Environments
One of the most commonly analyzed families of distributions in the mechanism design literature
are regular distributions. These are distributions such that the virtual value function is non-
decreasing. Formally, we say that distribution F is regular if and only if φ(p) is non-decreasing:
φ(p) , p−
(1− F (p))
f(p)
.
As pointed out in Section 1.2, for these distributions several approximation guarantees have
been obtained in diverse settings. One of the main insights used in the literature is that the
profit function associated to this family of distribution is concave in the quantile space. Indeed,
let R(p) = p · (1 − F (p)) and consider the change of variables q = 1 − F (p). Define the profit
function in the quantile space as Rˆ(q) = q · F−1(1 − q) then
d
dq
Rˆ(q) = F−1(1− q)−
q
f(F−1(1− q))
= φ(F−1(1 − q)),
since φ(·) is non-decreasing we can conclude that Rˆ(q) is concave. The concavity of Rˆ(q) allows
arguments similar to the ones leveraged in Theorem 1. For example, Dhangwatnotai et al.
(2015) leverage this property to show that with one bidder, the expected profit from random
pricing(uniformly selecting a quantile) is half the profit of the optimal monopoly price. In turn,
it becomes appealing if a similar approach would work in our framework. In particular, in the
regular distribution setting, is it possible to work in the quantile space, leverage the concavity
of the profit functions, and then show that a good approximation guarantee obtains?
Recall that for each segment k ≥ 1, the profit function comes from a cdf Fk for which we
assume its pdf fk is well defined. In order to switch to the quantile space, for any p ∈ Θ, we
would need to define
qk = 1− Fk(p) and Rˆk(q) = q · F
−1
k (q).
The optimal uniform price profit, ΠU , is given by
ΠU = max
0≤q≤1
K∑
k=1
αk · Rˆk(qk)
s.t. F−1k (1− qk) = F
−1
j (1− qj), ∀k, j.
Note that in this formulation we have gained that the objective function is the summation
of concave functions. However, we have introduced additional constraints compared to the
original formulation of ΠU in Section 2. These constraints stems from the fact that under
uniform pricing each segment receives the uniform price p, and since qk = 1 − Fk(p) we must
have that F−1(1 − qk) = F
−1(1 − qj) for all segments k, j ≥ 1. At this point, the natural
approach would be to lower bound each Rˆk by a triangle shaped function—similar to Figure 1
(a) but in the quantile space. Then solve the resulting optimization problem and, hopefully,
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obtain a good approximation guarantee. Unfortunately, for common regular distributions, the
former approach fails as established by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Failure of regular distributions).
There exist regular distributions with common and bounded support for which the optimal uni-
form price delivers an arbitrarily small profit guarantee as the number of segments increases.
Proof. We construct regular distributions {Fk}
K
k=1 such that Π
U/ΠM → 0 as K ↑ ∞. For L > 0
large, define
Fk(p) =
1− e−(K−k+1)p
1− e−(K−k+1)L
, ∀p ≥ 0, and αk = 1/K ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Thus, we consider truncated exponential distributions with support in [0, L] . Note that these
distributions are regular because
φk(p) = p−
(1 − Fk(p))
fk(p)
= p−
1
K − k + 1
+
1
(K − k + 1)
e−(K−k+1)L
e−(K−k+1)p
is increasing. For all k ≥ 1, the profit functions are
Rk(p) = p · (1− Fk(p)) = p ·
e−(K−k+1)p − e−(K−k+1)L
1− e−(K−k+1)L
,
whereas the per-segment optimal prices satisfy
p⋆k =
1− e−(K−k+1)(L−p
⋆
k)
K − k + 1
, and Rk(p
⋆
k) =
1− e−(K−k+1)(L−p
⋆
k)
K − k + 1
·
e−(K−k+1)p
⋆
k − e−(K−k+1)L
1− e−(K−k+1)L
.
First, notice that p⋆k ≤ 1/(K − k+1). Then the full price discrimination profit can be bounded
as follows
ΠM =
K∑
k=1
αkRk(p
⋆
k)
=
K∑
k=1
1
K
e(K−k+1)p
⋆
k
(
e−(K−k+1)p
⋆
k − e−(K−k+1)L
)2
(K − k + 1)(1− e−(K−k+1)L)
(a)
≥
K∑
k=1
1
K
e1
(
e−1 − e−(K−k+1)L
)2
K − k + 1
(b)
≥
e
(
e−1 − e−L
)2
K
K∑
k=1
1
K − k + 1
≈
e
(
e−1 − e−L
)2
K
· log(K),
where in (a) we used that the function eλx
(
e−λx − eλL
)
is decreasing for x ∈ [0, L]. In (b) we
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used L large enough such that L > 1. The uniform price profit for some price p is
K∑
k=1
αkRk(p) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
p ·
e−(K−k+1)p − e−(K−k+1)L
1− e−(K−k+1)L
≤
p
K
K∑
k=1
e−(K−k+1)p
=
p
K
K∑
k=1
e−kp
=
p
K
·
1− e−Kp
ep − 1
≤
1− e−Kp
K
≤
1
K
,
where the second to last inequality holds because we always have that p + 1 ≤ ep. With this,
we can conclude that
ΠU
ΠM
=
max
p≥0
{∑K
k=1 αkRk(p)
}
ΠM
≤
1
K
e(e−1−e−L)2
K · log(K)
=
1
e (e−1 − e−L)
2
· log(K)
→ 0, K ↑ ∞.
Proposition 5 establishes that for some regular distributions, uniform pricing can perform
arbitrarily poorly compared to optimal third-degree price discrimination. Moreover, in the
proof, we use exponential distributions, and therefore the result also holds for MHR (monotone
hazard rate) distribution. The intuition behind this result is similar to that of Proposition
4. We consider exponential distributions such that at the optimal uniform price, most of the
per-segment profits will be low, and therefore, they will not contribute much to ΠU , see Figure
4. Since for exponentials, the associated profit functions decay quickly after they peak, they
behave in a similar manner as the case of non-common support distributions where the upper
end of the support are increasing. Indeed, in the proof of Proposition 5 we obtain a similar
profit guarantee as in the proof of Proposition 4, namely, O(1/ log(K)). Finally, we note that
to prove the proposition, we use truncated exponential distributions. In turn, we only relax the
concavity of the profit functions but we keep the common and finite support assumptions intact.
To conclude this section, we consider the case of triangular instances on quantile space.
These are instances for which the profit functions in the quantile space are triangle-shaped.
They are widely used in the literature of approximate mechanism design as a bridge to provide
good profit guarantees. However, in our setting they can perform arbitrarily poorly.
Proposition 6 (Triangular instances).
15
p0
Rk(p)
0.36
0.18
0.12
0.09
0.07
.5 p0
∑
K
k=1 αkRk(p)
0.14
.47
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Example for construction of profit functions from regular distributions in Proposition 5 with
K = 5. In (a) we illustrate the profit functions for each segment where the per-segment optimal profit
is e−1/k and the per-segment optimal price 1/k. In (b) we show
∑K
k=1 αkRk(p) with maximum value
0.14 (bounded above by 1/K).
For triangular instances defined by
Fk(p) =


1 if v ≥ vk;
p·(1−qk)
p·(1−qk)+vk·qk
if v < vk,
there exists a choice of {αk}
K
k=1 ∈ (0, 1), {vk}
K
k=1 ∈ R+ and {qk}
K
k=1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
ΠU/ΠM → 0 as the number of segments increases.
Proof. Let us start by considering triangular instances, the profit functions are
Rk(p) = p · F¯k(p) =


0 if v ≥ vk
p·vk·qk
p·(1−qk)+vk·qk
if v < vk.
Note that Rk(p) is increasing and concave up to vk and then is constant and equal to zero for
p ≥ vk. For each curve the optimal price is vk (minus small ε > 0), thus
ΠM =
K∑
k=1
αk · vk · qk (3)
For the static contract, the optimal price must be achieved at one of the v1, . . . , vK . There-
fore,
ΠU = max
i∈{1,...,K}
{ K∑
k=i
αk ·
vi · vk · qk
vi · (1− qk) + vk · qk
}
Next we will establish that ΠU/ΠM → 0 as K →∞. Consider the instance
vk =
1
(K − k + 1)
, qk = 0.5, and αk =
1
K
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
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Hence,
K∑
k=i
αk ·
vi · vk · qk
vi · (1− qk) + vk · qk
=
1
K
K∑
k=i
1
(K−i+1) ·
1
(K−k+1)
1
(K−i+1) +
1
(K−k+1)
=
1
K
K∑
k=i
1
2(K + 1)− (k + i)
.
It is possible to show that the last term above is decreasing in i, and therefore,
ΠU =
1
K
K∑
k=1
1
2K + 1− k
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
1
K + k
≈
1
K
∫ K
1
1
K + x
dx =
1
K
log
( 2K
K + 1
)
.
We also have that
ΠM =
K∑
k=1
αk · vk · qk =
1
2K
K∑
k=1
1
(K − k + 1)
=
1
2K
K∑
k=1
1
k
≈
1
2K
log(K).
Thus,
ΠU
ΠM
≈
1
K log
(
2K
K+1
)
1
2K log(K)
= 2
log
(
2K
K+1
)
log(K)
→ 0 (≈ 2 · log(2)/ log(K)).
5. Worst Case Performance
In this brief section, our objective is to investigate the worst case performance of uniform pricing.
For this purpose, suppose there are K segments and without loss of generality let us assume
that
0 ≤ α1R1(p
⋆
1) ≤ α2R2(p
⋆
2) ≤ · · · ≤ αKRK(p
⋆
K). (4)
Using this condition we can verify that the ratio ΠU/ΠM is always bounded below by 1/K.
Indeed, note that ΠU ≥ ΠU (p⋆K) and
ΠU (p⋆K) =
K∑
k=1
αkRk(p
⋆
K) ≥ αKRK(p
⋆
K) =
K times︷ ︸︸ ︷
αKRK(p
⋆
K) + · · ·+ αKRK(p
⋆
K)
K
≥
1
K
K∑
k=1
αkRk(p
⋆
k),
where in the last inequality above we use Eq. (4). This proves that the worst case performance
of uniform pricing with respect to third-degree price discrimination is potentially 1/K. In what
follows, we argue that this lower bound performance can indeed be achieved. 4
Let us consider atomic valuations, that is, every segment k has a unique possible value
denoted by pk. Under perfect price discrimination, the monopolist can charge the price pk to
the buyer and extract full surplus:
∑K
k=1 αkpk. Under uniform pricing, the monopolist charges
a fixed price p across all segments and collects profit only from those segments whose price, pk,
4Proposition 2 in Malueg and Snyder (2006) provides an inductive argument with linear demand functions. Here
we provide a constructive argument with atomic distributions.
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is larger that p:
∑K
k=1 αkp1pk≥p. In turn, the optimization problem we would like to solve to
assess the performance of uniform pricing becomes
min
αk,pk


max
p≥0
∑K
k=1 αkp1pk≥p∑K
k=1 αkpk
, s.t.
K∑
k=1
αk = 1, :: αk ≥ 0 :: ∀k

 .
Observe that in the above problem, without loss of generality, we can assume that the prices
pk are ordered. This allows us to simplify the numerator in the objective above. Note that the
maximum in the numerator must be achieved at some price pj for j ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and for any
pj we have
K∑
k=1
αkpj1pk≥pj = pj
K∑
k=j
αk.
In turn, this enables us to reformulate the problem as
min
αk


max
j∈{1,...,K}
pj
∑K
k=j αk∑K
k=1 αkpk
, s.t. p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pK ,
K∑
k=1
αk = 1, :: αk ≥ 0 :: ∀k

 . (5)
Next, we exhibit values of pk and αk such that the ratio in the problem above is arbitrarily close
to the lower bound 1/K. Let ε > 0 be small, define the prices
pk =
ε
K
(
1 + ε
ε
)k
, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, and pK =
1
K
(
1 + ε
ε
)K−1
,
and let the per-segment proportions be
αk =
1
K
1
pk
, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Next, we verify that the above prices and proportions are feasible. Indeed, it easy to verify that
pk is increasing in k while for the per-segment proportions we have that αk > 0 and
K∑
k=1
αk =
K−1∑
k=1
1
ε
(
ε
1 + ε
)k
+
(
ε
1 + ε
)K−1
= 1.
Now let us look at the objective in problem (5). Given our choice of prices and proportions,
we have that αkpk = 1/K and, therefore, the denominator in Eq. (5) equals one. For the
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numerator consider j ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} then
pj
K∑
k=j
αk =
ε
K
(
1 + ε
ε
)jK−1∑
k=j
1
ε
(
ε
1 + ε
)k
+
(
ε
1 + ε
)K−1
=
ε
K
(
1 + ε
ε
)j (
ε
1 + ε
)j−1
=
1 + ε
K
,
and pKαK = 1/K. Therefore the objective in Eq. (5) evaluated in our current choice of prices
and proportions equals
max
j∈{1,...,K}

pj
K∑
k=j
αk

 = max
{
1
K
,
1 + ε
K
}
=
1 + ε
K
.
In conclusion, we have exhibited an instance for which the performance of the optimal uniform
price is as close as one may desire to the worst performance guarantee, 1/K. We summarize
this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Worst performance achieved).
There exists an atomic instance and ε0 > 0 such that
min
αk,θk
ΠU
ΠM
≤
1 + ε
K
, ∀ε ∈ (0, ε0).
6. Conclusion
We considered the revenue performance of uniform pricing in settings where a monopolist may
engage in third-degree price discrimination. We establish that, for concave revenue functions
with common support, using a single price can achieve half of the optimal revenue the monopolist
could potentially garner by engaging in third-degree price discrimination. Our revenue guarantee
is robust. It does not depend on the number of market segments or prices the seller might
use. We then investigate the scope of our revenue guarantee. We establish that by relaxing
either the concavity or the common support assumptions, uniform pricing can deliver arbitrarily
bad revenue guarantees as the number of market segments increases. Interestingly, for regular
distributions and triangular instances—leading cases in the literature of approximate mechanism
design—we show that uniform pricing can again obtain poor revenues guarantees that scales
with the number of market segments.
Depending on the nature of a market, different types of price discrimination are possible.
A plausible direction of future work is to consider an environment in which the seller can
exercise second-degree price discrimination by creating a menu of prices and quantities. For
example, consider a setting with K different markets each of which is characterized by a different
distribution of valuations. Within each market the seller may offer an optimal menu of prices
19
and quantities. However, due to legal or business constraints, it is often the case in practice that
such strong price discrimination is not implementable. Instead, the seller might only be able to
offer the same menu across all markets. In turn, it becomes a natural question to explore the
performance of this limited menu versus the full discriminating one. Another related question
arises in the same domain of non-linear pricing in which, within a market, the seller offers
different quantities and prices to buyers of different valuations. In this setting, it would be
interesting to investigate the revenue performance of a simple menu consisting of a single price
in which buyers self-select their quantities.
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